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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance characteristics 
on foreign investments in the Indian IT industry.  
Foreign capital is important for industries in an emerging economy as it bridges the gap 
between investment requirements and the domestically available capital. Prior research has 
shown that corporate governance characteristics of a firm can influence the FII inflow into it.  
The sample for this study consists of 113 firms from the Indian IT industry spanning 9 years 
from 2005 to 2013. The Indian IT industry was chosen as the setting for this study due to the 
increasing levels of FII inflow to these companies and because IT companies are among the 
pioneers in the formulation and implementation of corporate governance regulation in India. 
The ownership pattern of a firm, measured through parameters like its promoter shareholdings, 
and the corporate governance characteristics as indicated by the total number of directors in 
the board are analyzed to understand their impact on inflow of FII to the firms. A fixed effect 
regression was run on the sample and the results were analyzed. 
The results show that firms with more concentrated promoter holdings have lower levels of 
foreign investments. Larger board size seems to attract higher levels of foreign investments. 
However the number of independent members on board and the board chairman being 
independent have been found to be insignificant in determining FII inflow to a firm. Higher 
market capitalization and profitability help in attracting foreign investments. These results 
suggest the need for a strong current level of performance before inviting international 
investments for fund raising and also hints at a convergence in corporate governance of Indian 
IT firms towards the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance.  
Key Words: FII, Corporate governance, ownership patterns, board characteristics, Indian IT 
industry 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Foreign capital is important for industries in an emerging economy as it bridges the gap 
between investment requirements and the domestically available capital (Lakshmi, 2011). 
Sami, Wang and Zhou (2009) have shown that foreign capital has a positive impact on 
profitability ratios like ROA, ROE and Tobin-Q value. Studies also show that firms with a 
significant level of foreign investment show higher levels of performance as compared to firms 
owned solely by domestic promoters (Chincholkar, 2010). Foreign capital is found to play an 
increasingly important role in the rapid industrial and economic development around the world 
(Banerjee, 2013). Hence identifying the determinants of foreign investments at a firm level is 
important. 
Corporate governance in an organization is found to have a strong impact on the level of foreign 
investment in the firm. One reason that Das (2014) suggests is that while investing abroad, an 
investing company would face information asymmetries and corporate governance is an easy 
replacement for expensive information collection process. An IFC Survey on corporate 
governance also identifies firm level corporate governance characteristics as major 
determinants of foreign investments (Khanna and Zyla, 2010). Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
conclude that foreign institutional investors have a strong bias for large firms, firms that are 
members of world index, firms cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange and firms with low insider 
ownership. Other studies also have shown a positive relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and foreign investments (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki, 2005; Leuz, Lins 
and Warnock, 2010).  
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance characteristics 
on foreign ownership. The setting for our study is the Indian IT industry. A literature review 
has helped us identify that corporate governance characteristics such as proportion of shares 
held by promoters, total number of directors in the board, proportion of independent directors 
in board and the impact of having an independent director as the chairman of the board could 
be important in determining foreign investments in firms. The findings of our study indicate 
that firms with more concentrated promoter holdings have lower levels of foreign investments. 
Except the total number of board members, other measures of corporate governance including 
the number of independent members on board, and the chairman being an independent board 
member have been found to be insignificant in attracting foreign investments to a firm. In fact, 
the evidence point to the possibility of higher board independence dampening the inflow of 
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FIIs. The current financial performance of a firm has been found to have a strong association 
with the level of foreign investments that it garners, and thus a strong current performance is a 
pre-requisite for attracting foreign capital. 
Literature Review 
Several studies have previously looked at the relation between foreign investment and 
corporate governance characteristics in the context of different countries. While some of these 
studies concentrate in a sample of firms in a single nation, the others have a multi-country 
sample set. 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) analyzed the firm level and country level corporate governance 
characteristics that influence the foreign institutional investments on a sample that consisted of 
firms from 27 different countries. Their study concluded that the corporate governance 
characteristics of a firm including cross-listing in the U.S., membership in International 
indexes, and high global visibility through high foreign sales or analyst coverage influence the 
institutional decision to invest in a firm.  
Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2010) attempted to understand the factors that influence foreign 
investment in firms based on a sample of 4,409 firms from 29 countries. They concluded that 
that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and 
disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems, 
consistent with the notion that foreign investors prefer firms with strong corporate governance 
standards. 
The investment allocation choices of actively-managed US mutual funds in emerging market 
equities was studied by Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005). This study established that at 
the country level, US funds invest more in open emerging markets with stronger accounting 
standards, shareholder rights, and legal frameworks and at the firm level, in firms that adopt 
discretionary policies such as greater accounting transparency and the issuance of an ADR. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) investigated the association between firm level disclosure and 
corporate governance structure in Zimbabwe. They found that disclosure, proportion of non-
executive members, institutional share of ownership and audit committee independence are 
positively related to share of foreign ownership. The results are thus consistent with the notion 
that foreign investors are attracted to companies with effective corporate governance structures, 
low information asymmetry and strong cash positions. 
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Min and Bowman (2012) undertook a similar study based in Korea. The intent of the study was 
to see if appointment of independent directors in the board of Korean companies, which was 
stipulated by the Korean government after the 1997 financial crisis, had any significant impact 
on the level of foreign investments in the companies. The results showed that foreign investors 
placed considerable value on the appointment of independent directors. 
 With a sample of Japanese firms, Desender, Aguilera and Crespi (2013) studied the patterns 
of foreign investments and corporate governance structure. Board independence and the board 
audit committee characteristics were the features of the board studied and it was found that the 
board independence, board of corporate auditors’ independence and the presence of an external 
auditor are ensured when foreign ownership is high, while this is absent when foreign 
ownership is low. 
Another study was undertaken in the Indonesian context by Chevalier, Prasetyantoko and 
Rokhim (2006) to understand if foreign ownership participation is affected by corporate 
governance practices. The proxy for corporate governance practice in this study was a firm’s 
capital structure choice. The study has found that MNCs have more prudent financing structure, 
meaning rather than going for short-term financing policies which ignore other financing 
options MNCs will have more professional management of their financing policies. 
Ananchotikul (2006) has tried to study if foreign investment is an effective tool in improving 
corporate governance practices in Thailand. The paper questions conventional wisdom and 
proves that when a foreign company buys large stakes, there is no improvement in corporate 
governance practices because they act as insiders and having a weak corporate governance 
structure suits them more. This is one of the few studies reviewed which shows a negative 
relationship between the accepted corporate governance best-practices and foreign 
investments. 
Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) studied the foreign ownership patterns and corporate governance 
disclosure practices in Ghana. Their research is rooted on the argument that better disclosure 
practices ensure greater transparency which makes a firm more attractive for foreign 
investments. The results indicate a statistically strong relation between foreign investments and 
the level of firm disclosure. 
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Table 1. Literature Review of CG and Foreign Investment relations 
Authors CG and Foreign Investment Relation 
Ferreira and 
Matos(2008) 
Cross-listing in the U.S., membership in International indexes, 
and high global visibility through high foreign sales or analyst 
coverage influence the institutional decision to invest in a firm.  
 
Leuz, Lins and Warnock 
(2010) 
Foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor 
outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures 
that are conducive to governance problems. 
Aggarwal, Klapper, and 
Wysocki (2005) 
Firms that adopt discretionary policies such as greater accounting 
transparency and the issuance of an ADR are preferred by foreign 
investors 
 
Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007) 
Disclosure, proportion of non-executive members, institutional 
share of ownership and audit committee independence are 
positively related to the share of foreign investment 
Min and Bowman (2012) Foreign investors place considerable value on the appointment of 
independent directors. 
 
Desender, Aguilera and 
Crespi. (2013) 
Board independence, board of corporate auditors’ independence 
and the presence of an external auditor are ensured when foreign 
investment is high 
Ananchotikul (2006) When a foreign company buys large stakes, there is no 
improvement in corporate governance practices because they act 
as insiders and having a weak corporate governance structure 
suits them more.(Negative relationship between board 
independence and foreign investments) 
Bokpin and Isshaq 
(2009) 
Better disclosure practices ensure greater transparency which 
makes a firm more attractive for foreign investments 
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FII in India and the Indian IT Industry 
The attractiveness of developing nations as a destination for foreign capital has increased, due 
to the high likelihood of obtaining robust returns and also due to the decreasing attractiveness 
of developed nations (Haldar and Rao, 2012). India is an appropriate example to understand 
this phenomena. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no notable studies in 
India regarding the FII inflow determinants. This study aims to fill the gap. 
There has been significant increase in FII into India after a dip in 2006-2007 in the midst of a 
global recession, reaching a peak in 2014 (see Figure 1). A major contribution of this FII has 
been into the Indian IT industry. 
Figure 1. FII inflow to India, 2002-2014 (Indiastat) 
  
The Indian IT industry has gained a brand of its own in the international market. IT-ITES 
industry in India has two major components, IT services and Business Process 
Outsourcing.  The growth in the service sector in India has been led by the IT–ITES sector, 
contributing substantially to increase in GDP, employment, and exports. The sector has 
increased its contribution to India's GDP from 1.2% in FY1998 to 7.5% in FY2012 (Nasscom). 
In the year 2014, the industry has recorded a revenue of USD 114 billion as against USD 9 
billion in 2009 (Nasscom). The other contributions of the industry towards the Indian economy 
can be briefly identified as below. 
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Table 2. Role of IT industry in the Indian economy (Nasscom) 
Relative industry share in the GDP 8.1% 
Employment offered 3.1mn (Largest private sector employment) 
Women employment >1mn (38% of total employees are women) 
Private Equity/ Venture Capital investments $ 2.4bn (Industry with the highest 
investments) 
Net value add  60-70% (Highest net value add sector) 
Service exports  38% (Highest share of service exports) 
IT-SEZ in Tier 2-3 cities 99 (Promoting balanced regional growth) 
 
The relatively high contribution of the IT industry to the Indian economy is visible from the 
above details.  
While the global macroeconomic scenario remained uncertain, the IT industry exhibited 
resilience and adaptability in continually reinventing itself to retain its appeal to clients 
(Nasscom). Software firms are more exposed to global competition as compared to other 
industries in India (Khanna and Palepu, 2007) and hence needs to follow competent standards 
of corporate governance to attract business and investment. As in December 2014, IT sector in 
India has an annual FII inflow of INR 27222.2 million, making it the second largest recipient 
of FII after financial sectors (CDSL India, 2014). Figure 2 demonstrates the levels of FII in the 
Indian IT industry in the recent years. 
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Figure 2. FII inflow to Indian IT industry, 2011-2014 (CDSL India) 
 
 
With the increasing levels of foreign investments in this industry (Indiastat) IT industry offers 
a suitable ground for understanding determinants of foreign investments in Indian firms.  
This study specifically looks at those firms which belong to the IT-ITES category of Indian IT 
sector and has not included firms in the Business Process Enabling.  
Theory building and hypothesis 
Agency theory is the most recognized theory in corporate governance research (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Jensen, 1985). According to agency theory, the managers are opportunistic and 
self-interested and hence need to be kept under control by monitoring mechanisms or by 
incentive alignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Promoter’s share holding 
As per Indian Companies Act of 1956 (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2014) promoter means 
a person who has been named so in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual 
return referred to in section 92, has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly 
and in accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the 
company is accustomed to act. 
IT industry is an industry in India that has persistently high concentrated ownerships with 
promoters or family owners, yet which has the least advantages of concentrated ownership 
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while accessing capital or talent through the international market (Khanna and Palepu, 2007). 
According to the authors, the IT industry, due to its low capital requirements, little government 
regulation on entry, and a relatively low level of minimum economic scale to achieve 
profitability and the abundance of talented professional who showed no preferences to family 
or group owned IT companies, ensures competent performance by entrepreneur owned firms 
also. 
Previous studies have shown that promoter’s share holdings are inversely related to foreign 
investments (Lakshmi, 2011). Yin-Hua and Woidtke (2005) argue that investor protection is 
weak in companies with boards dominated by members affiliated to the controlling family, 
which in-turn attracts lower levels of investment by foreign investors. Byun, Hwang and Lee 
(2011) found that the degree of information asymmetry increases with ownership 
concentration, dampening the interests of the foreign investors in them.  
Thus there would be a negative relationship between foreign investments and the percentage 
of shares held by the promoters. 
H1: The foreign investments in an Indian IT firm would be negatively related to the 
percentage of shares held by the promoters. 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Foreign investors usually place more importance on proper governance mechanisms as 
compared to local investors. The rationale for this argument is that foreign investors are usually 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2004) and face higher risks of 
being expropriated by corporate managers and/or controlling shareholders.  
Board of directors is a major monitoring mechanism that can prevent expropriation of 
shareholders by the management (Fama and Jensen, 1985). When the boards are more 
independent, they monitor the managers better and hence the shareholder interests are 
protected.   
Board size has several implications for board independence (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). A 
smaller board can be easily dominated by the CEO, whereas a larger board would need more 
time and effort in the part of CEO to build consensus from the board and hence larger board 
size ensures greater board independence (Shaw, 1981). Previous studies in the Indian service 
sector with a sample from software and telecommunications industry have shown that the board 
11 
 
size is a strong control mechanism against managerial indiscretion and fraud (e.g. Kumari and 
Pattanayak, 2014). Hence a larger board would be preferable for attracting FII in an IT firm. 
As per SEBI clause 49, a member of the board becomes independent if,  
 He does not have any material pecuniary relationships or transactions with the 
company, its promoters, its senior management or its holding company, its subsidiaries 
and associated companies 
 He is not related to promoters or management at the board level or at one level below 
the board, he has not been an executive of the company in the immediately preceding 
three financial years 
 He is not a partner or an executive of the statutory audit firm or the internal audit firm 
that is associated with the company, and has not been a partner or an executive of any 
such firm for the last three years 
 He is not a supplier, service provider or customer of the company, and  
 He is not a substantial shareholder of the company, i.e. owning two percent or more of 
the block of voting shares. 
Studies have shown that the presence of independent directors reduces the likelihood of fraud 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000) and facilitates better earnings 
management (Klein, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Similarly, having an independent director as 
the board chairman also ensure greater transparency (Min and Bowman, 2012; Raheja, 
2005).   When the chairman is an independent board member it would avoid power misuse and 
allow the chairman and the board to exercise independent judgment over CEOs decision (Boyd, 
1995). Thus the following can be hypothesized. 
H2a: There is a positive relation between the number of directors on board and foreign 
investments in Indian IT firms. 
H2b: There is a positive relation between the proportion of independent directors and 
foreign investments in Indian IT firms. 
H2c: There is a positive relation between the board chairman being an independent board 
member and foreign investments in Indian IT firms. 
The overall hypothesis 2 can be stated as  
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H2: There is a positive relation between corporate governance mechanisms and foreign 
investments in Indian IT firms.  
These hypotheses have been graphically represented in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. The FII determinant hypothesis model 
 
 
 
                                                     -ve 
 
 
 
                                                                                             +ve 
 
 
 
 
Sample and methodology 
Data 
The sample consists of 113 IT firms of India. The sample was chosen based on data availability, 
and those firms which have all the relevant data available are a part of the sample. Prowess 
database of CMIE (Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy) contains data filed by all the 
listed Indian companies. The initial sample was the entire population of IT companies. Once 
those with incomplete data were eliminated, the sample size came down to 113. The sample 
was collected for a 9 year period from 2005 to 2013. Thus the data is a panel data of 113 cross 
sections over 9 years with a total of 1017 data points.  
Promoter 
holdings 
Corporate governance 
mechanism 
 Independent 
directors 
 Independent 
chairman 
 Board size 
      FII rate 
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All data were collected from the Prowess data base of CMIE and Bombay Stock Exchange 
website. 
Variables 
The following are the variable names, their significance and source. 
Table 3: Variables, definition and data source 
Variable Name Definition Source Type of 
Variable 
FII_percentage Foreign institutional 
investment as a 
percentage of total 
number of shares 
issued 
BSE website Dependent 
variable 
Prom_percent Shares held by 
promoters as a 
percentage of total 
number of shares 
issued 
BSE website Independent 
variable 
Tot_Dir Total number of 
directors in the 
company board 
Prowess Independent 
variable 
Prop_Ind_Dir Number of 
independent board 
members as a 
proportion of total 
number of board 
members 
Prowess Independent 
variable 
Ind_Chairman Whether the chairman 
of the board is 
independent or not, 1 
Prowess Independent 
variable 
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to indicate yes and 0 to 
indicate no 
MCAP Market Capitalization 
calculated as the 
number of shares 
multiplied by price of 
one share 
Prowess Control variable 
ROA Measure of 
profitability calculated 
as the Net Income by 
Total Assets 
Prowess Control variable 
Gearing Debt to Equity ratio Prowess Control variable 
Liq_Quick Measure of liquidity 
[(Current assets – 
Inventories)/ Current 
liability] 
Prowess Control variable 
Liq_Current Measure of liquidity 
[Current assets/ 
Current liability] 
Prowess Control variable 
Liq_Cash Measure of liquidity 
[Cash / Current 
liability] 
Prowess Control variable 
 
Prior research was referred to identify the control variables. Dahlquist and Robertsson(2001) 
and Jiang and Kim (2004) provide evidence supporting a positive relationship between foreign 
share ownership and company size (measured in terms of market capitalization), profitability 
and a negative relationship with gearing ratio. Lin and Shiu (2003) also show that liquidity 
ratio is positively related to foreign share ownership. Consequently, company size (market 
capitalization), return on assets, liquidity ratios and gearing ratio are controlled for in this study.  
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Methodology 
A multiple regression equation can be represented as  
y = β0 + β1*x1 +  β2*x2 +  β3*x3 + ….+ βn*xn + ε, where y is the dependent variable and x1, 
x2, x3…xn are the independent variables, β0 is the constant, β1 represents the change in y with 
respect to x1,  β2 represents the change in y with respect to x2 and so on and ε is the unexplained 
variance. A significant and positive βn indicates as positive impact of xn on y and a significant 
and negative βn indicates a negative impact. 
The model used in the study is 
FII_percentage = β0 + β1 * Prom_Percent + β2 * Tot_Dir + β3 * Prop_Ind_Dir + β4 * 
Ind_Chairman + β5 * Control Variables + ε 
As per the hypotheses, we expect β1 to be negative and significant and β2, β3 and β4 to be 
positive and significant. Significance ensures that a relation is not due to chance alone. 
A panel data of 113 cross-sections over 9 years was analysed through fixed-effects model. 
Panel data ensures more accurate inference of model parameters. Panel data usually contain 
more degrees of freedom and more sample variability than cross-sectional data.  
The p-value from the Hausman test was considered to decide between the random and fixed 
effects model. The random effects model returned extremely low p-value, proving the 
inappropriateness of the model to analyse the given data and hence the fixed effects model was 
used. A two way fixed effects model, which controls both for the year and the firm has been 
used in this analysis.  
Statistical Results 
The GRETL software was used to run the regression model and the summary statistics of the 
variables and the correlation matrix are as below. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics of the variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
FII_Percentage 5.1335 5.71 0 56.96 10.117 
LProm_Percent 3.4502 3.6797 -3.5066 4.4849 1.0355 
Tot_Dir 7.7109 7 0 30 3.8353 
Prop_Ind_Dir 0.48201 0.5 0 1.33 0.2168 
Ind_Chairman 0.12094 0 0 1 0.32622 
LMCAP 2.4377 2.53 0 6.63 1.4884 
LROA -0.00024 -0.0565 -8.4429 5.7814 1 
Gearing 0.44422 0.06 0 28 1.4506 
Liq_Quick 3.312756 1.535 -0.81 93 7.46 
Liq_Current 3.479173 1.64 0 93 7.1425 
Liq_Cash 1.230531 0.19 0 79.7 4.867 
 
From the table 4, we find that the highest variability is shown by the liquidity variables 
suggesting a variation in the patterns of asset holdings of the companies in the sample. 
The promoter percentage initially showed a high variability as expected since the sample 
contains both family owned and privately owned companies. The data was normalized by 
considering the logarithm of promoter holdings. Similarly market capitalization and ROA 
variables also initially displayed high variability and were skewed. So these were also 
normalized before the statistical analysis.  
Table 5. Correlation Matrix of the variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
FII_Percent 1           
l_Prom_Per
cent 
-0.01 1          
Tot_Dir 0.311 0.157 1         
Prop_Ind_D
ir 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.056 1        
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Ind_Chairm
an 
-0.07 0.07 -0.009 -0.097 1       
LMCAP 0.415 0.140 0.276 -0.064 0.011 1      
ROA 0.194 0.240 0.151 -0.049 0.047 -0.056 1     
Gearing -0.04 0.04 0.019 0.049 -0.02 -0.056 -0.271 1    
Liq_Quick -0.02 -0.009 -0.016 0.014 0.082 0.033 -0.006 -0.02 1   
Liq_Curren
t 
-0.02 -0.012 -0.017 0.015 0.083 0.030 -0.007 -0.02 0.9 1  
Liq_Cash -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 0.012 0.082 0.041 -0.006 -0.01 0.9 0.9 1 
 
 
As from the Table 5, we find that there is no significant correlation among variables except 
between the liquidity ratios. Hence, to avoid multi-collinearity issues, we used only one of 
these, namely the cash ratio, in the subsequent analysis, but also run the same model with the 
other two to confirm the results.  
The regression was run on five different models, the first four with FII percentage regressed on 
each of the independent variables, promoter share, total number of directors, the proportion of 
independent members and independence of the board chairman. The final model had FII 
percentage regressed on all the independent variables. 
The results of regression are displayed below. While we present here a brief description of the 
regression results, a detailed discussion follows in the subsequent section. 
Table 6.  Fixed effects model regression output with 113 companies over 9 years 
Dependent variable: Percentage of FII inflow (FII_percentage) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 2.38** 
(0.0412) 
-
3.9402*** 
(0.0001) 
0.216237   
(0.8102) 
-0.132   
(0.8231) 
-0.2470    
(0.861) 
Promoter 
Holdings 
-0.8223*** 
(0.0071) 
   -
1.0446*** 
(0.0004) 
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Total number 
of directors 
 0.6048***  
(0.0001) 
  0.6622*** 
(0.00) 
Proportion of 
independent 
directors 
  -1.04714    
(0.4436) 
 -0.8326    
(0.5477) 
Independent 
chairman 
   -1.573*  
(0.0847)   
  
-1.3207    
(0.1543) 
Market 
Capitalization 
2.30197***                    
(0.000) 
1.8445*** 
(0.000) 
2.23*** 
(0.000) 
2.253***   
(0.000) 
1.845***  
(0.000) 
ROA 1.24079***   
(0.0003) 
0.7312***  
(0.0188) 
1.0216***    
(0.0014) 
1.04377***     
(0.001) 
1.0635***     
(0.0013) 
Gearing 0.0385042    
(0.856) 
-0.144920   
(0.4772) 
-0.02294    
(0.9128) 
-0.0304     
(0.8844) 
-0.05    
(0.808) 
Liquidity -0.00434    
(0.02753) 
-0.00385  
(0.3151) 
-0.00423   
(0.2764) 
-0.0038    
(0.33) 
-0.00337    
(0.3825) 
      
R Squared 0.3258 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.37 
F-value 3.58                             
(<0.0001) 
4.57 
(<0.0001) 
3.67 
(<0.0001) 
3.7 
(<0.0001) 
4.27 
(<0.0001) 
Note: *** is for significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent 
level 
From Table 6, we find that the coefficient is negative and significant for the promoter holdings, 
as stated in hypothesis 1. In Model 1, where it is the only independent variable, the coefficient 
is -0.822317 and is significant at the 1 percent level. Later in Model 5, where all the variables 
are included in the regression, the coefficient of promoter holdings is -1.0446 and is once again 
significant at the 1 percent level. These imply that a higher percentage of promoter holdings is 
associated with lower foreign investments. 
With regard to the board size, we observe a positive coefficient for total number of directors in 
Model 2 (with a coefficient of 0.604830) and Model 5 (with a coefficient of 0.6622). The 
coefficients in both models are significant at the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent with 
our hypotheses that a larger board size attract greater levels of FII to a firm.  
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The coefficient for the proportion of independent directors turn out to be statistically 
insignificant in Models 3 and 5 which invalidates our hypothesis that a board with a higher 
proportion of independent directors would be preferred by a foreign institutional investor, over 
one with a smaller proportion of independent directors.  
Finally, the role of an independent chairman in attracting foreign investments shows up with a 
coefficient that is negative and significant in Model 4 where it is the only independent variable. 
This goes against our hypothesis that the board chairman being an independent member of the 
board gives the foreign investors greater confidence in investing in a firm. . But in the full 
specification (Model 5), the coefficient of chairman independence is negative but insignificant. 
Table 6 also shows that the coefficients of the control variables viz. market capitalization and 
ROA are significantly and positively related to the FII percentage. However the liquidity and 
the gearing ratio (Debt to Equity) have insignificant coefficients. 
To summarize, we find support for hypothesis 1 i.e. foreign investors prefer firms with lower 
levels of promoter holdings over those firms which are held largely by promoters. 
 Hypotheses 2a is accepted; in other words a larger board does attract higher foreign 
investments. However we cannot find support for the hypotheses that that the board 
independence measured through proportion of independent directors in the board (hypothesis 
2b) and  chairman being an independent member of the board (hypothesis 2c) facilitates higher 
levels of foreign investments. The hypotheses 2b and 2c being rejected, there is only partial 
support for hypothesis 2. 
We confirmed the robustness of the above findings by repeating the exercise with multiple 
measures of liquidity (Current ratio and Quick ratio). These estimations returned similar results 
as in the case explained above. Alternatively we used ROE as the performance measure instead 
of ROA and this specification also gave us similar results as before.  
 
Discussion 
 
We find that the ownership pattern of a firm is strongly associated with foreign investments. 
Those firms with a higher share of promoter holdings invite lower FII, supporting the argument 
that when the promoters have a very large holding they can easily manipulate and take decision 
20 
 
in their own interest with utter disregard to the other investors and hence are looked upon with 
caution by foreign investors.  
Indian companies having high concentration of ownership by the promoting family, face 
critical agency issues (Singla, Veliyath and George, 2014). Our results indicate a need for 
dilution of family shares to ensure foreign capital inflow to family owned IT firms as well. Our 
results correspond with other studies that have established a negative association between 
promoter/family holdings and level of foreign investments (Zuobao, Feixue and Shaorong, 
2005; Kim et. al, 2010). However, some studies have concluded that in countries with low 
investor protection, promoter holdings can be an alternative to poor legal protection and hence 
can attract foreign capital (Lskavyan and Spatareanu, 2011). With its common law heritage, 
this does not seem to be the case with India. 
Among the corporate governance variables, the only one which showed a highly significant 
and positive relation to the FII inflow is the total number of directors in the board. This outcome 
can be interpreted from an agency and a resource based perspective. According to the agency 
perspective, a larger board ensures lower levels of CEO domination and hence more board 
independence, thereby inviting foreign investors. According to the resource based view, a 
larger board would be needed to interact more with the external environment, provide inputs 
from various streams of knowledge as per their expertise and also to manage a large 
organization (Pfeffer, 1972). This also can be a reason behind the foreign investors favouring 
firms with larger boards.Previous studies have also exhibited similar results (Das, 2014).  
In the Indian context, the rest of the corporate governance mechanisms have an insignificant 
or negatively significant association with levels of foreign investments, though it was 
hypothesized that all of these would be positive and significantly related to FII. Proportion of 
independent directors and the independence of the chairman are negative and insignificant in 
the complete model. These factors together determine the board independence. Most of the 
studies in the area have found a positive relation between the board independence and foreign 
investments (Weinstein, 2008; Moore et. al, 2012; Desender, Aguilera and Crespi, 2013; Das, 
2014). The Indian IT industry does not comply with this general conclusion, the possible 
reasons for this exception needs to be understood. Firstly, this may be a trend specific to the 
Indian IT industry. Secondly, it could be that foreign institutional investors themselves would 
want to behave as insiders in a firm and their interest to invest in a firm with moderate levels 
of corporate governance could facilitate this (Ananchotikul 2006).  
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The results also point to the importance or the lack of it, which the foreign investors attach to 
the concept of board independence as measure through the proportion of independent members 
and the chairman being independent. Literature has previously pointed out the inadequacy of 
these measures of independence, suggesting that board process is what ensures independence 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003) and also that a board is never truly independent (Harvard Law 
Review, 2006). Our outcome could also be a result of data issues since the sample size had to 
be reduced to 113 due to unavailability of data for some companies.  
As regards the control variables of the regression model, we find that FII in the Indian IT 
industry depends more on the financial soundness and the size of the company. Thus our study 
is consistent with several other previous studies that foreign firms prefer larger and financially 
sound firms (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Covrig and Lilian, 2002; Kang and Stulz, 1997; 
Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005). This implies that a strong current is a pre-requisite for 
IT companies before eyeing an international sources for investments. Previous studies assert 
that liquidity of the firm has significant positive influence on the investment decisions of firms 
(Bailey, Chung and Jun-Koo, 1999) and explain that it is safer to invest in liquid assets than 
illiquid ones because it is easier for an investor to get his/her money out of the investment. 
However, in our study, the liquidity variables are insignificant and negative.  This suggests that 
investors prefer firms with higher investment returns as compared to the low risk ones with 
higher levels of liquid holdings. 
The conclusions drawn from our study also point towards an increasing convergence in the 
Indian IT firms towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. Convergence in the 
context of corporate governance can be defined as an increasing isomorphism in the 
governance practices of public corporations from different countries (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2009). Several authors have professed that under the pressures of globalization and due to 
efficiency reasons, all the nations in the world would converge towards an Anglo-Saxon model 
of dispersed ownership (Coffee , 1999; Hansmann and Kraakman 2000), making it more 
preferable as hypothesized in the study. Those companies with a large share of promoter or 
family ownership also might be forced to disperse their shares more, under the pressure of 
convergence. 
From the outcome of this study, the following model of FII determinants in Indian IT industry 
can be identified.  
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Figure 4: FII determinants model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications and limitations 
The study implies that those IT firms aiming at building their capital through foreign 
investments need to ensure strong current financial performance before going international. It 
would be easier for firms with lower promoter holdings to build foreign capital as compared to 
the ones with a significant percentage of shares held by its promoters. The findings also point 
towards a corporate convergence pattern with all the firms moving towards the Berle-Means 
model of an ideal corporation (Berle and Means, 1932) of a largely dispersed share ownership.  
This study, like several others (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000), assume a linear relationship 
between the corporate governance characteristics. The exploration of a non-linear relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and foreign investment inflow has been 
necessitated by similar studies which conclude that there are optimum values of corporate 
governance variables, under and above which their contribution diminishes (e.g. Garg, 2007). 
In similar vein, it is necessary to investigate the optimum corporate governance characteristics 
for maximum foreign investment inflow, by adopting a spline or the piece wise linear 
regression methodology. 
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The study has not studied the reverse causality of foreign investments leading to better 
governance mechanisms. Some other variables like promoter good will and reputation might 
impact the outcomes in a different manner. Alternate tests with other variables to ensure the 
robustness of the study has not been done either. Restrictions of the data set to a single industry 
limit the generalizability of the results. Future research may aim to overcome some of the 
limitations of this study for more robust results. 
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